Analytical Investigation of Audit Decision Making under Uncertainty by Kimbrell, Janet Illeen
COPYRIGHT 
By 
Janet Illeen Kimbrell 
December, 1979 
AN ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUDIT 
DECISION MAKING UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY 
By 
JANET ILLEEN KIMBRELL 
4 
Bachelor of Science in Education 
Southeastern Oklahoma State University 
Durant, Oklahoma 
1969 
Master of Professional Accounting 
University of Texas at Arlington 
Arlington, Texas 
1976 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
December, 1979 

AN ANALYTICAL INVESTIGATION OF AUDIT 
DECISION MAKING UNDER 
· UNCERTAINTY 
Thesis Approved: 
... ~ 
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Introduction 
Interest in auditing services1 is brought about by an aversion to 
uncertainty--uncertainty concerning the economic condition of a business 
firm. In order to reduce that uncertainty and protect the public 
welfare, the Securities Act of 1933 required that an independent 
accountant certify financial statements contained in registration 
statements. The Securities Exchange Aet of 1934 further required 
that listed companies file annual reports and that those annual 
reports be certified by independent accountants. 
In this paper a theory will be developed which will explain 
auditor behavior under uncertainty. In particular, the theory explains 
how the economically rational auditor makes decisions on the amount of 
auditing services he will offer in the face of uncertainty. It is 
important to be able to explain auditor behavior, because if the factors 
which influence auditor decision making are understood, then these 
factors can be manipulated to provide "natural" incentives to facilitate 
the regulation of auditor behavior. Considerable interest has been 
expressed in regulating auditor behavior, i.e., inducing auditors to 
make preferred decisions. Two congressional committees have expressed 
an increased concern regarding this issue. It is therefore important 
to understand the "natural" incentives which cause an auditor to make 
a decision, because there is reason to believe that operating on incen-
tives is a more effective regulatory tool than is imposition from 
1Auditing services as used in this paper applies only to the attest 
functions--not to internal auditing or any other work performed by 
public accountants. 
1 
outside the profession, such as government regulation. 
Theory construction will begin by specifying an auditor decision 
model. But before the model is formulated, the nature and environment 
2 
of the auditing profession will be discussed. Given that this is an 
economic analysis, it is important to understand the auditor's economic 
environment. The purpose here is to compare the auditing profession 
with other industries or professions on the basis of economic character-
istics. Following this will be an explanation of the axiomatic structure 
underlying the development of the decision model to be considered. The 
next section specifies the model under several different economic 
scenarios. The final section discusses the results of varying these 
scenarios and the use of these results in inducing preferred auditing 
decisions. 
Nature of the Auditing Profession 
The majority of the 54 U. S. jurisdictions have certain regulatory 
statutes which restrict the licenses to express opinions on financial 
statements to persons having the title of Certified Public Accountant. 
Due to the structure of the regulatory statutes when considered together 
(the Securities Acts and these state laws), independent accountant has 
become synonymous with an independent Certified Public Accountant. 
The auditor is responsible for making an independent verifica-
tion of the financial statements and issuing an audit report on the 
findings of that verification. To obtain this verification, the auditor 
first studies and then makes an evaluation of the internal control 
system of the client firm. The auditor performs tests of compliance 
to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. Using the results of the 
evaluation, the auditor will then decide how much additional audit 
evidence should be collected. In general, there is an inverse relation 
between the assessed quality of internal control and the quantity of 
the requisite additional evidence. This process of collecting addi-
tional evidence includes physical observation, confirmation, etc., of 
the balances shown on the financial stateMents. Such procedures are 
referred to as substantive tests. 
After reviewing events which have occurred after the balance sheet 
date, the auditor then assesses all the test results and makes a 
determination of the type of audit report to be expressed on the 
financial statements of the firm. The facet of the audit process of 
interest in this paper is substantive testing-~specifically the choice 
3 
of a level of substantive testing after the evaluation of internal 
control has been made. 
The Securities Act of 1933 also established the auditor as being 
liable to any purchaser of the securities when the certified financial 
statements in the registration statement were shown to be misleading 
or false. If auditors are found to be negligent in the collection 
of audit evidence, they are liable for this negligence to those 
who relied upon the financial statements. Subsequent litigation 
has tended to support that view. It is appropriate, then, to conceive 
of some amount of audit.evidence that is.optimal for society which has 
to be performed before the auditor can be considered to be not negli-
gent and thus devoid of liability.· If the auditor shows "reasonable 
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and due care" in the collection of audit evide~ce, then the liability is 
reduced. The model used in this paper will contain an explicit 
characterization of this potential liability or loss to the auditor. 
Competitive Aspects of the Auditing 
Environment 
Before looking at the model and methodology to be employed in 
this paper, it will be useful to consider some aspects of the supply 
and demand for auditing services. 
The initial demand for auditing services is faily regular, 
since firms are required to have their statement certified on 
a regular basis. This is like most other services--except medical 
care or warfare military services. However, after the audit is under-
taken and the evaluation of internal control is made, the auditor has 
to make a decision as to how many units of audit services he will 
supply (i.e, how many units of time will be allocated to the gathering 
of audit evidence). 
The demand for audit services is associated with some probability 
of a loss to the firm. Without the audit service, the business firm 
would not be allowed to operate· (or at least be unable to procure funds 
in the capital markets). With audit services, it .is still not certain 
the business firm will continue to operate. It is possible that the 
audit may reveal information harmful to the firm's status, or even worse, 
it is possible the audit may not reveal information which, if discovered 
at a later time, could be harmful to the firm. Therefore, the need 
for audit services is risky in itself, making it similar to other 
commodities such as medical care. Choosing a physician will not 
necessarily mean a cure or prevention of illness. It is not being 
argued here that auditing is as risky as medical care, but that it 
bears some slight resemblence in-this aspect. 
5 
6 
The auditor is expected to behave differently from other sellers 
of services or products. Due to the requirement that he be independent, 
he is viewed to have less of a self-interest in the financial state~ 
ments of his client. Due to the large potential damage which can come 
to third party users, the auditor has certain ethical considerations 
in offering his services--considerations beyond those, for example, of 
a clothing dealer or a book salesman. Society's expectation is that 
the auditor's concern for the correct information will override the 
desire to please the customers. (It could also be argued the auditor's 
shared liability for the large potential damage would override the 
desire to please the customers.) The auditor is viewed as a professional 
who provides expert certification of the financial statements of the 
.client company. It is not apparent that this characteristic is as 
pronounced as in the medical profession, as evidenced by the amount of 
charity work which occurs in the medical profession (Mushkin, 1958), 
but there is less self-interest involved than in many fields. In 
fields in which self-interest is low, such as the medical profession, 
it is also claimed that financial considerations are not the main 
factors in the amount and type of services to be offered-(Arrow, 1971). 
The opposite would hold for fields where self-interest is high. It is 
contended here that auditing services lie somewhere in the range between 
these two extremes and definitely not at the same end of the spectrum 
as the medical care profession. It would be difficult to defend the 
position that the auditor could avoid the consideration of the potential 
liability to him. 
Product uncertainty is greater in the market for audit services 
than in that for many markets. The only way a consumer can test the 
quality of auditing service is through consumption and any results are 
not lnunedlate since time is usually required to verify quality. There 
may also be the belief that the auditor, by virtue of being an expert 
in possession of highly technical skills, possesses information that 
the client does not have--information as to the manner in which the 
statements should be presented and the consequences of that presenta-
' tion. This may or may not be true; but it could be perceived by the 
client as such. 
To reduce this quality uncertainty regarding auditors' services, 
provision of auditing services is restricted to holders of the CPA 
certificate, which supposedly ensures their competence to perform the 
attest function. This licensing restricts entry to the profession, 
which of course, restricts supply and increases the cost of audit 
services. The extent to which the CPA certificate does this is 
unclear. It is contended by some (Friedman and Kuznets, 1945; also 
Pichler, 1973) that it is substantial. It has been pointed out that 
in the past, the failure rate on the CPA examination greatly exceeds 
that for the examinations to qualify doctors, lawyers, and dentists. 
It has been stated by unofficial AICPA sources that approximately 
10% of those who take all four parts pass them on the first attempt 
(Pichler, 1973). Observations of a few of the state newsletters 
indicate it may be even lower. It has been pointed out, though, that 
the eventual pass rate by serious candidates writing the examination 
two or more times is probably as high as 80% and any restriction 
is more in the nature of a delay than an outright barrier to entry 
(Revsine and Juris, 1973). 
In the past, the costs of an accounting education have been 
comparable to other fields requiring only a basic college education. 
7 
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mean a limitation in the supply of auditors, but simply better trained 
accountants. One university which has a professional school with a 
five-year program recently published a report that 80% of its graduates 
who aat for the CPA exam for the first time in 1978 passed all four 
parts (National Association of State Boards of Accountancy, 1979). 
It is argued that the five year accreditation plan for accounting 
schools would eliminate some sources of training as the number of 
schools achieving accreditation might be small and thus accreditation 
could limit supply. Pearson (1979) and Pichler (1973) have argued 
that standards are being raised because the educational backgrounds 
have increased; but the percentage passing remains constant. Pichler 
also points to the high passing rate for other' fields such as medicine. 
His conclusion does not necessarily follow. Arrow (1971) contends 
the high passing rate for physicians is due to the extremely high 
standards for entrance to medical school, and thus the qualifying exam 
for physicians is redundant. Knowing the passing rates for examinations 
in two different areas says little about the standards in those areas. 
It is also erroneous to argue that a constant percentage implies 
an increase in standards. The technical knowledge required to be an 
expert in accounting has increased significantly and it seems only 
reasonable that the amount of knowledge contained in the examination 
should also increase significantly. 
An additional factor which concerns quality is that the attest 
function can only be performed by a CPA. Less trained personnel, such 
as accountants without CPA certificates, cannot legally offer these 
audit services in most states. This limits the range of quality of 
audit services. In a market where many qualities are offered, there 
10 
are varying prices. By licensing, many alternative qualities of audit 
services are eliminated, and also the alternative prices that might 
occur. This same Hituation occurs in the medical profession where 
there are only a few paramedics, etc., performing medical care services 
(Arrow, 1971). 
Pricing practices include fees for service and very little pre-
payment. There also appears to be little closed panel practice 
(contracts binding the client to a particular auditing firm) whereas 
in many business firms, prepayment and exclusive service contracts are 
common competitive practices. 
Until recently competitive bidding was forbidden by the AICPA 
code of ethics. The Antitrust Division of the1 Department of Justice 
brought suit to enjoin it from limiting competitive bidding and the 
AICPA then deleted this restriction from its code. But most states 
still have such competitive bidding sanctions; and these prove to be 
valid since the Sherman Act does not apply to state law. The extent, 
then, to which this rule is applied varies from state to state (Causey, 
1976). 
Advertising was also not previously permitted; but in 1978 the 
AICPA Rule 502 was amended to allow advertising after a U. S. Supreme 
Court ruled that restrictions on advertising were unconstitutional 
(Wood and Ball, 1978). It is too early at this point to determine 
the effect of this ruling change. 
In summary, the regulatory bodies and courts may be making 
the auditing profession more competitive, whereas the actions of 
the auditing profession itself (by raising of standards or educational 
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requirements) may be restricting competition. The upshot of the above 
is that it cannot be argued that auditing exists in a "pure" competition 
ehvironment. There are limited restrictions to entry and not extensive 
price competition. But auditing is also not a true monopoly given 
the number of small and large firms in the industry. For this reason, 
the auditor's decision model considered in this paper will initially 
be examined under pure competition. Then the model will be examined 
under monopolistic conditions. By considering ~ extremes (price 
competition and monopoly) the analysis will facilitate prediction of 
the impact of changes in the degree of competition which may occur in 
the future. 
Development of the Model and Its 
Underlying Axioms 
Theory construction in auditing itself is in an embryonic state. 
One approach involves fitting some statistical'model to a data set 
consisting of auditor decisions, e.g., internal control evaluations, 
obtained in some experimental setting. Examples include Ashton (1974), 
Warren (1975), and Joyce (1976). The difficulties with such hypothe-
tical data are well known (Slavic and Lichtenstein, 1971). The major 
difficulty is the development of a general decision model from specific 
cases. 
Another approach is the development of statistical decision rules. 
Both classical (Elliot and Rogers, 1972; Arkin, 1974; and Roberts, 
1974) and Bayesian (Birnberg, 1964; Kraft, 1968; Tracy, 1969; Knoblett, 
1970; Corless, 1972; and Smith, 1972) rules have been developed. Such 
works usually take factors such as the determination of audit risk as 
exogenous, and thus can only be considered tangential to the development 
of a theory about auditor behavior. 
A third approach is exemplified by works such as Scott (1973, 1975), 
which view the auditor as a completely altruisitic agent who makes 
decisions in order to minimize the opportunity loss of some third 
party user(s)--remaining all the while oblivious to his own utility. 
The reasonableness of this view has been severely criticized by Magee 
(1975). 
A fourth approach involves viewing the audit decision process 
as that of a rational economic being, i.e., one who seeks to maximize 
his own expected utility. Examples of this approach are provided by 
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Kinney (1975) and Magee (1977). However, these works have assumed that 
the auditors' utility functions are linear, i.e., that auditors are 
irtdifferent to risk. And there is evidence that auditors are indeed 
risk averse (Newton, 1977). 
The proposed research is an expansion of the fourth approach des-
cribed above. The method will be analytical and the auditor will be 
viewed as a rational economic agent. Further, risk aversion on the 
part of the auditor will be dealt with explicity. A particular audit 
decision--the choice of a level of substantive testing-•will be formu-
lated in competely general terms. 
Models incorporating risk aversion have received little attention 
in the auditing literature; however, they have received extensive atten-
tion in the economics literature. Before 1959, uncertainty had played a 
relatively small role in decision models. In 1959, Mills showed that 
randomness (uncertainty) in demand will cause different results from 
the classical economics approach where demand is taken as.deterministic. 
Other studies considering demand as a random variable and incorporating 
risk were Nelson (1961), Oi (1961), Tisdell (1963), Dhrymes (1964), 
Hymans (1966), Dreze and Gabszewicz (1967), Stigum (1969), Zabel (1970), 
Baron (1970 and 1971), Sandmo (1971), and Leland (1972). These 
studies, concerned with competitive and monopolistic firms, showed 
that output under uncertainty will be something different than 
output under certainty, and that the risk attitudes of the entrepreneur 
affect output. 
Studies of uncertainty conditions were made for taxation effects 
(Penner, 1967; Mossin, 1968; and Stiglitz, 1969). These also showed 
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that incorporating risk into the model will produce different conse-
quences. Other studies along the same line considered the effect of 
uncertainty on savings decisions (Leland, 1968; Sandmo, 1970); on 
factor services (Walters, 1960); on utilization of capital (Smith, 
1969; Meyer, 1975); on insurance decisions (Borch, 1963 and 1966; 
Mossin, 1968); and illegal activities (Becker, 1968; Allingham and 
Sandmo, 1972; Block and Reineke, 1973; Ehrlich, 1973; Sjoquist, 1973; 
Block and Reineke, 1975). The last group of studies have a slight 
similarity to this study in that there is an explicit penalty involved 
in both models. The auditor has a liability for not exercising due 
care and the law-breaker is penalized when convicted of breaking 
the law. 
The model developed and analyzed in this study will use the axiomatic 
structure employed in many previous economic analyses--the expected 
utility model of von Neumann and Morgenstern. It is thus assumed 
that the expected utility model is a reasonable characterization of 
2 the actual behavior of auditor preferences for risky outcomes. The 
expected utility model rests upon the five axioms discussed on the 
following pages. 
2The following discussion on the expected utility model and the 
underlying axioms was developed from six sources: von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947), Luce and Raiffa (1957), Markowitz (1959), Arrow 
(1963), Borch (1968), Horowitz (1970), and Keeney and Raiffa (1976). 
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Axiom 1 
A preference or indifference relation exists between any two 
items or any two sets of items. x1 is at least as desirable as 
x2 (X1 ~ x2) or x2 is at least as desirable as x1 (x2 >r\, x1). In other 
words, the auditor can express whether he prefers x1 to x2 (X1 > x2), 
x2 to x1 (x2 >- x1) or is indifferent between x1 and x2 (X1 "' x2) • 
This axiom is needed, for if an individual could not state his pre-
ference for a set of actions, then he would not be led to make a 
preferred decision. 
Axiom 2 
Preferences are transitive. If one exhibits a preference for x1 
over x2 , and x2 over x3 , then x1 should be preferred to x3• x1 ~ x2 
The X. could represent different_choices 
l. 
of careers or several risky undertakings composed of a set of payoffs 
xj, each of which has a probability pij" Each of the xj is subject to 
a transitive preference or indifference reJation. This axiom can be 
written as: 
. 
. . . , 
If these are numbered such that x1 ~ x2 ~ • • • t xj-l t xj ;;:, xj+l ~ • • • ~ Xn, 
it would imply that x1 is the most preferred payoff and Xn the least 
preferred. 
Suppose there are three alternatives, Xp x2 , and x3, and the 
payoffs (say, net cash flows) are uncertain for each project. However, 
management makes the following probability assessments: 
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xl = ( [. 31 400; [. 21 300; [.2] 200; [. 31 100) 
x2 = ([.2] 400; [. 21 300; [ .11 200; [. 51 100) 
x3 = ( [. 41 400; [.2] 300; [.4] 0) 
Labeling the xj, x1 = 400, x2 = 300, ... ' XS = 0, then x1 >- x2 ~ · • • ~ x.5 • 'V 
Also, x3 could be written as: 
x3 = ([.4] 400; [.2] 300; [O] 200; [O] 100; [.4] O), 
where p 31 .4, P32 = .2, p 33 = O, etc. Thus, the payoffs can be 
ordered and all projects can be considered to contain each of the 
payoffs, even if some happen to have a probability (p .. ) of zero. 
l.J 
The second axiom implies that individuals are consistent in their 
preferences. This may be difficult to believe' as complexity of some 
situations may introduce ambiguity, but this analysis assumes that a 
given individual will be able to order preferences in a manner that 
is consistent with actual beliefs. This ordering is based upon 
attitudes toward risk and a prior ordering of payoffs (X.). This 
J 
second axiom is important because the individual will usually make 
the decision that is preferred; and by observing this consistency 
in preferences, a second party can determine the choice preferred by 
a decision maker. 
Axiom 3 
When the projects Xi (i = 1, ••. , m) are themselves offered with 
probability of di as a subset of some superproject Yk, 
[d ] x ) ' 
m m 
* there can be determined a project X = ((p1 ] x1 ; ••. ; [p.] x.; ... ; ] J 
[pn] xn) containing only the original payoffs xj {j = 1, ..• , n) such 
* * that one is indifferent between Yk and X (Yk ~ X ). Also, 
m 
p. = I: d. P.j. 
J i=l l. l. 
Consider the example used previously with x1 , x2 , and x3 and these Xi 
each have probabilities of .2, .2, and .6, respectively. Yk 
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([.2] x 1; [.2] x2; [.6] x3). One may compute the probability (pj) of 
each payoff. For example, the probability of a 400 payoff {p1) is given 
by the probability of getting x1 times the probability of receiving 
400 after choosing xl plus the probability of getting x2 times the 
probability of receiving 400 after getting x2, and so forth. Therefore, 
P1 = .2 (. 3) + .2 (. 2) + .6 (. 4) = . 34 
P2 = .2 (. 2) + .2 (.2) + .6 (. 2) = .20 
P3 = .2 (.2) + .2 (.1) + .6 (O) = .06 
P4 = .2 (. 3) + .2 (.5) + .6 (0) = .16 
P5 .2 (O) + .2 (O) + .6 (. 4) = .24 
rn 
Note that the l: p. = 1, as all possible payoffs are considered. ] i=l 
* This axiom implies that given a project X = ( [. 34] 400; [.20] 300; 
[.06] 200; [.16] 100; (.24] 0), and a superproject Yk, then one would 
be indifferent between the two. * In essence, the X project represents 
a simplification of Yk' but does not change the payoffs or their 
probabilities. The necessity for this axiom is the need to compute 
and compare payoffs and their probabilities so that they may be ordered 
in a preference ranking. 
18 
AxJom L1 
An individual can express preference and indifference between a 
-certain or guaranteed payoff xj and a risky alternative xj which 
involves only two alternatives, x1 and Xn' where x1 ~ xn. In addition, 
-probabilities t. and 1-t. can be found such that (1) X. "' X., where 
J J J J 
x. = ([t.] x1 ; [1-t.] x ); and (2) probabilities can be found such that J J J n 
Xj > xj, if and only if tj > tj, where xj = ([tjJ ~l; [1-tjJ Xn). 
For example, suppose there is a certain payoff x. = $300 and a 
J 
risky payoff xj which involves x1 = $400 with some probability tj and 
xn = $0 with some probability (1-tj). Dependent upon the probabilities 
tj and (1-tj), an individual can express preferences or indifferences. 
For example, he might prefer x. = $300 to an X. where tj = .4. 
J J 
Furthermore, it is possible to ascertain probabilities for which he 
would be indifferent, in this case, say, tj = .75. It can then be 
seen that if the probability of receiving x1 = $400 is greater than 
t = .75, then the risky alternative i., will be preferred to the j J 
certain x .. When an individual is indifferent between two alternatives, 
J 
one of which is an amount to be received for certain, that certain 
amount is called the "certainty equivalent" of the other, risky choice. 
If, as in the above example, the certainty equivalent (or the 
certain amount, X.) is equal to the expected value of the risky payoff 
J 
Xj, the individual is referred to as being linear in risk. In other 
words, an individual is "indifferent" to risk if he is indifferent 
between the gamble (the risky payoff, xj) or receiving the expected 
value of the gamble with certainty. Consider the cash flow values in 
the previous example, where x1 = $400, xn = $0. For the individual 
linear in risk, the following relations hold: 
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400 ~ ([l] 400; [O] O); 300 ~ ([.75] 400; [.25] 0); 200 ~ ([.5] 400; 
[.5] O); 100 ~ ([.25] 400; [.75] O); 0 ~ ([O] 400; [l] 0). 
A risk-evader (or an individual who is said to be averse to risk) 
will not accept the risky alternative unless its expected value exceeds 
the certain payoff. A risk-taker will accept the risky alternative 
even though its expected value is less than the certain payoff. The 
risk-evader demands that the expected value be greater than the value 
of the certainty equivalent (the certain payoff) before he accepts it. 
The risk-taker is willing to accept a gamble which has an expected value 
less than its certainty equivalent. For example, a risk-taker may have 
the following relation: 300 ~ ([.6] 400; [.4] O). A possible relation 
for a risk-evader is 300 ~ ([.9] 400; [.l] O). 
This axiom does not imply that all risk-evaders or risk-takers 
need the same probability to accept a gamble; nor does it imply that 
all individuals will consistently behave as one or the other. Risk 
attitude depends upon the situation. The axiom only implies that, in 
a given situation, a given individual will be indifferent between the 
risky alternative or the certain payoff, for some probabilities, t. 
J 
and 1-t .• Axiom 4 also states that there will exist a certainty 
J 
equivalent for every risky choice. The implication of Axiom 4 may be 
depicted as shown in Figure 1. 
The demands of the risk-evader lie above the straight line, because 
a higher probability of winning (a higher expected value) than that of 
the person linear in risk is required before acceptance of a risky alter-
native. The opposite will hold for the.risk-taker as his demands lie 
below the straight line. Because it is assumed that the individual will 
always prefer a higher probability of winning to a lower probability 
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of winning, the curves will be assumed to be monotonically increasing. It 
is possible for individuals to have a curve which might, at some point, 
lie above the line and some points below the line; but individuals are 
usually classified as being either risk-takers or risk-evaders. The 
risk-evader's curve will be assumed to be strictly concave and the 
risk-taker's curve will be assumed to be strictly convex. This is done 
for ease of mathematical treatment, even though there may be some 
points for which it does not always hold. 
Probability 
of winning 
the most 
preferred 
Axiom.5 
1.00 
0 Certainty Equivalent 400 
Figure 1. Utility Functions 
If the risky alternative X. is equally preferred to x. and replaces 
J J 
the payoff xj in a project xi' the new project containing xj will be 
equally preferred to the old project containing x .• In effect if 
J 
21 
xj "' x.i ' and X' = ([pil] xl; . . . . [pij] xj; ... ; [pin] Xn), then i ' 
X! 
"' xi. This axiom implies that all of the x. 's could be replaced by ]. J 
their equally pref erred risky alternatives. Invoking Axiom 3 then 
implies that the superproject Xi can then be replaced by the superproject 
- - -
xi' which implies xr"' xi' where xi is nothing more than a superproject 
containing subprojects Xj = ([tj] x1 ; [1-tj] Xn). Then a project, 
-* - * Xi"' X., can be determined where X. = ([p.] x1 ; [1-p.] x ) and from the i J. J. J. n 
* - - . * second axiom, as Xi"' Xi and Xi"' Xi; then Xi"' Xi. Xi may be replaced 
* with Xi which only involves the most preferred and least preferred 
* alternatives. The Xi which has the highest probability of winning will 
* * be the more preferred, or Xi > ~when pi > pk. (This does not mean 
that this analysis will tell an individual whi1ch decision he should make, 
but which decision is actually preferred. In particular pi > pk only , 
points out the fact xi is preferred to ~; xi} ~ not because pi > pk, 
but because xi~ ~' pi has to be greater than pk.) 
To illustrate the meaning of this fifth axiom, consider again the 
example used to explain the second axiom which had choices of x1 , x2 , and 
and x3 , and specific probabilities (p .. ) for each payoff x. (seep. 16). l.J J 
Furthermore, suppose a particular individual has the following 
preferences relations: 
400"' ([l] 400; [O] O); 300"' ([.90] 400; [.10] 0); 200"' ([.80] 
400; [20] O); 100"' ([.70] 400; [.30] O); 0"' ([O] 400; [l] O). 
This individual displays the characteristics of risk aversion and for 
-him, x1 'V x1 , where 
x1 = [.3] ([l] 400; [O] O); [.2] ([.90] 400; [.10} 0); [.2] ([.80] 
400; [.20] O); [.3] ((.70] 400; [.30] O); [O] ([O] 400; [l] 0). 
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* * Then using the third axiom, x1 "' x1 , where x1 • ( [ • 85] 400; [ .15] O). 
* * Also, x2 "' x2 a ([.81] 400; [.19] O); and x3 "' x3 = ([.58] 400; 
[.42] O). For this risk averse individual, p1 > p2 > p3 and this 
* * * implies that x1 )... x2 > x3• Since x1 "' x1 , X:z "' x2 , and x3 "' x3 , then 
x1 >- x2 ). x3• Thus x1 is the preferred project for this specific 
individual. This is also the project preferred by the individual that 
··is linear in risk as it is the project with the .highest expected 
value. And it has been shown (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) that 
individuals linear in risk will choose the project with the highest 
expected value. But the risk-taker will not necessarily choose x1 • 
In fact, the risk-taker will choose x3 in this case, because it offers 
the highest probability of receiving 400 (and incidentally, the 
highest probability of receiving O). If the risk-taker asserted 
equivalences as did the risk-averse individual above, it could also 
be shown in this way that he would choose x3• 
Axiom 5 (sometimes referred to as the substitution principle) 
implies that if two payoffs are equally preferred, it does not matter 
(1) which is promised, (2) whether one is risky, or (3) if one or both 
are certain. This says that the risky situation itself does not affect 
one's preference. For example, suppose an individual can draw.from an 
urn which contains one red and one blue ball and he is indifferent 
between receiving $300 with certainty and gambling on $400 with a prob-
ability of .5. Then the individual will also be indifferent when·given 
the following two choices: (1) draw ared ball and receive $300 or 
draw a blue ball and receive zero; or (2) draw a red ball and get to 
accept the gamble or draw a blue ball and get nothing. It is not the 
risky situation itself which affects one's decision--it is the individual's 
set of preferences, attitudes toward risk, and the set of probability 
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assessments made by the individual. When any one of these differs among 
different indi.viduals, then it is possible (and most likely) that their 
decisions will be different. 
An individual who conforms to these axioms will be able to state 
preferences and by observing his preferences, a utility function 
U = u(xj) denoting his preferences can be derived. It has been shown 
(von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) that an individual will choose that 
alternative which will maximize expected utility. The function U = u(x.) 
J 
reflects one's index or ranking for certain and uncertain outcomes. 
Alternatively, it might be thought of as a rule by which the .individual 
orders preferences. 
Axiom 4 implies that u(x.) increases with increasing x. which 
J J 
means u'(xj) >O. The shape of the utility function is not derived 
from the axiom, but rather from the personal risk attitudes of the 
individuals. 
Assume the simplest linear case where u(x.) = X., as shown in 
. . J J 
Figure 2. Now consider the gamble x = ([p] x; [1-p] O), where pis a 
given probability. The expected value of X is px. The individual can 
also state a certainty equivalent, C, an amount to which he would be 
indifferent between receiving that amount for certain and the gamble, 
x. Thus, by assumption, the utility of C is equal to the expected 
utility of its equivalent gamble. 
Now the utility of the expected value of the gamble is: 
u(px) = px. 
The expected utility of the risky situation i (the gamble) is: 
Since pX 
E[u(X)] = pu(x) + (1-p) u(O) 
= pu(X) 
pu(x), then E[u(X)] = u(px} pu(x), 
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u(x) 
u(px) = pu(x) 
0 px = c 
Figure 2. A Risk Linear Utility Function 
which states, in w.ords, that. the. utili.ty . of the. expected. value of 
the gamble is equal to the expected utility ffom the gamble. In 
addition, since, u(px) • pu(x) • pX "' C, then the expected value of 
the gamble is also equal to the certainty equivalent of the gamble. 
As noted earlier, an individual will choose the alternative that 
maximizes expected utility. Thus, when u(Xj) is linear, only the 
expected value of the risky situation need be used in making choices 
between alternatives. 
Now consider the case where u(Xj) is concave. 
a curve of the form in Figure 3, for which u'(xj) > 
This will imply 
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u(x) 
u(px) 
pu(x.) 
0 c PX x 
Figure 3. A Risk 4verse Utility Function 
Consider again the gamble: 
i • ( [p] x.; [1-p] O) 
where p is a given probability and pX is the expected value of i. There 
will exist a certainty equivalent C for which the individual will be 
indifferent between receiving C for certain and x. Again the utility 
of C is equal to the expected utility of its equivalent gamble, i. 
Likewise, the utility of the expected value of the gamble is: 
u(px) • px. 
The expected utility of the risky situation i (the gamble) is: 
E[u(x)] • pu(x) + (1-p) u(O) z pu(x). 
Since u(xj) is strictly concave, then, 
u(pX) > pu(x), 
which, is exactly the definition for risk averse utility functions 
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). 
This implies that for the risk averse individual, the utility 
of the expected value of the gamble is greater than the expected 
· utility of the gamble. 
Also, since 
u(C) • E[u(X)] = pu(X) 
then 
u(px) > u(C) 
and u(Xj) being concave, 
pX > C. 
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Thus, for the risk averse case, the expected value of a gamble is also 
greater than the certainty equivalent of that gamble. 
The convex case, where u'(x) > 0 and u"(x) > O, is portrayed in 
Figure 4. 
u(x) 
0 pX c 
Figure 4. A Risk-Loving Utility Function 
Assume the same ~isky gamble, x, as in the two previous cases, 
with expected value pX, and a certainty equivalence C, where 
and 
u(C) "' E[u(X)], 
u(px) ""' px, 
E[u(x)] • pu(x). 
As u(Xj) is strictly convex, then 
u(px) < p[u(x)] 
which is the definition for a risk loving utility function. Then, 
u(pX) < u(C) 
implying 
pX < C. 
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In words, for the risk loving individual, the utility of the 
expected value of the gamble is less than the expected utility of the 
gamble, and the expected value of the gamble is less than the certainty 
equivalent of the gamble. 
This is not to say that all individuals are strictly concave or 
strictly convex, as there is some evidence that individuals have utility 
functions which are convex in one interval and concave in another 
interval (Friedman and Savage, 1948). It has also been shown that it 
is unlikely for individuals to be risk indifferent (Borch, 1963). 
But in this analysis, it is assumed that consideration i~ made of only 
the relevant.portion of that curve depicted by an individual's utility 
function and can regard the individual as being total risk indifferent 
or totally risk averse within that portion. 
With this basic understanding of the expected utility hypothesis, 
the model for the auditor can be developed. This analysis will first 
consider the auditor in a competitive environment as if he were 
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indifferent to risk and then averse to risk. The .impact of varying 
these conditions on the auditor's decision to produce units of audit 
service will be assessed. The analysis will then consider the auditor 
with a linear utility function versus a concave utility function in a 
monopolistic setting. Additional analysis will consider the effect 
of the ways penalty is assessed-upon the auditor. 
Model I--AnAuditor's Model Under 
Pure Competition 
Under the conditions of pure competition the auditor has no control 
over the price of the units of credit services to be offered. The 
I 
auditor may incur, in addition to the deterministic costs to be incurred 
in the production of the units of audit service, a penalty or additional 
loss because of his failure to offer enough audit units. Therefore, an 
auditor's profit function (ir) will be of the form 1T = PQ - c1 (Q) - c2(Q), 
.where Q denotes demand for units of audit services. Demand is the 
amount of services that society (or courts of law) will deem as being 
a sufficient amount for this particular audit. This can be thought of 
as an operationalization of the "due audit care" standard. If the 
auditor does not meet this amount, i.e., exercise due audit care, then 
there will be some penalty assessed. The amount of Q demanded by 
society is unknown at the time the auditor must make a decision. Let 
Q a D(P, v) where v is a random variable distributed by g(v) with zero 
. . . 2 
mean and P is the price for one unit of audit service. For simpli-
city, the unit will refer to a unit of time, which assumes that 
time reflects audit quality. While few would argue that time is 
synonomous with audit quality, the two terms certainly exhibit strong 
positive association. In any event, under pure competition, P is given, 
Q itself becomes a random variable and for simplicity, the probability 
density function of Q will be represented by f(Q) (instead of D(P,v)). 
2 See footnote 3 on page 43 for an additional explanation of g(v). 
29 
30 
The direct cost of producing Q 1e c1 • c1 (Q)'. Also, c2 • c2 (Q) is 
the penalty costs associated with the failure of the auditor to produce 
what may ultimately be determined to be an adequate audit. * Q is the 
amount the audit firm decides to produce for a particular audit. If 
* the amount supplied by the firm, (Q ), is less than the amount demanded 
* by society (Q), there will be a penalty. If Q ~ Q , then no penalty will 
be assessed. This analysis will make the assumption that there will be 
* a penalty assessed for all Q > Q • In Model I, · assume this 
penalty c2 to be a function of Q, the amount that should have been 
audited. There is no way of knowing if all "incorrect" audits will be 
protested, but it can be argued that, in general, over a period of 
time any negligence will be discovered. 
The auditor's utility function is denoted as U = u(~) where U is 
assumed to be a monotonically increasing function. The auditor's pro-
fit function will consist of two parts: 
~ = 1 PQ - c1 {Q) * for Q ~ Q , and 
* for Q ~ Q • 
Given the axiomatic structure described earlier, the auditor's 
decision can be characterized in terms of maximizing expected utility: 
* Q * •. 00 * E[u(~)] =/u[PQ - c1 (Q )] f(Q)dQ + J u[PQ -
0 Q* 
* c1 {Q ) - c2{Q) ]f(Q)dQ. · (1) 
For this expression to be at a maximum, two conditions must hold: 
dE[u(~)] • O 
* ' dQ 
and 
d2E[u(~)] 
----*---- < 0. 
dQ 
The satisfaction of the second order condition is shown in the 
Appendix. The first derivative of the expected utility is: 
* dE[u.*(rt)] _ JQ dcl * * * 
- - u'(P - ---;) f(Q)dQ + (l)[PQ - c1 (Q )] f(Q) 
dQ 0 dQ 
du 
where u' • d1T • 
* * * oo dc1 dc2 (O) u[PQ - c1(Q )] f(Q) + f u'[P - ---; - ---; ] Q* dQ dQ 
. * * * * f(Q)dQ - (1) u[PQ - c1 (Q ) - c2(Q ) ] f(Q ) , 
* * * The last term collapses to u[PQ - c1 (Q )] f(Q) as this is the 
* 
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expression evaluated where Q • Q and here c . • o. 2 Thus the expression 
becomes: 
dE(u*) = JQ* dcl Joo dcl dc2 
- - u'(P - ~) f(Q)dQ + * u'(P - ~ - ~) f(Q)dQ. 
dQ 0 dQ Q dQ dQ 
00 de 00 de dE(~) -- f ' 1) ( ) I ' 1 u (P - ~ f Q dQ - u (P - ~) f (Q)dQ + 
dQ 0 dQ Q* dQ 
oo dc1 dc2 f u' (P - ~ - ---;) f(Q)dQ. 
Q* dQ dQ 
00 
dE(ui "' f dc1 oo dc2 u'(P - ~) f(Q)dQ + f u'(- --;ii) f(Q)dQ. 
dQ 0 dQ Q* dQ 
. dc1 As P and---; are constants, then: 
dQ 
de 00 dE(~) • (P - !> f u' oo de f{Q)dQ - I u, c . ~> f(Q)dQ. 
dQ dQ 0 Q* dQ 
Setting (6) equal to zero, 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
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dc1 00 00 dc2 
(P 
- --.> J u' f (Q)dQ - I u' <--.> f (Q)dQ 
dQ 0 Q* dQ 
00 dc2 
dc1 J u' <-----;> f (Q)dQ p + g* dg =·--;;; 00 
dQ l u' f(Q)dQ 
0 
This is the optimal output condition under uncertainty.and perfect 
* dc2 
competition. Giventhatc2 is a decreasing function of Q, ~ < 0, 
dQ 
the second expression on the right side of (8) will always be negative. 
This implies that marginal costs of production will always be greater 
(7) 
(8) 
than price, which, in turn, implies that output increases as uncertainty 
is introduced into the model. To understand why output increases under 
I 
uncertainty, consider the model under certainty. Here the auditor acts 
co 
as if expected demand (Q) is the certain demand (Q • J Qf(Q)dQ), so the 
0 
firm will produce at Q under certainty. Given that price is fixed, then: 
00 dc2 
dc1 I u'-::- f(Q)dq p Q* dQ 
·--+ 
dQ co I u' f(Q)dQ 
0 
for the certainty output and 
oo dc2 I u' --... f(Q)dq 
dc1 Q* dQ p ... --. + __..._00 __ __._ __ _ 
dQ J u' f(Q)dQ 
0 
for the uncertainty output. Then: 
00 de 00 
d I* u' -!- f (Q)dQ d J* u' 
cl ·g dg cl Q. 
--+ 
-
-+ Joo U' * 00 dQ f (Q)dQ dQ I u' 
0 0 
(9) 
(10) 
de~ f (Q)dQ . 
dQ (11) 
f (Q)dQ 
dc2 
But Q "" Q implies --::- "" 0, then: 
dQ 
00 de 
I u' : f{Q}dQ dc1 dc1 Q* dQ 
--=--+ 
- * dQ dQ 
dc1 dc1 
··.and-::-<~ 
dQ dQ 
00 
I u' f{Q}dQ 
0 
dc2 
as~< O. 
dQ 
If marginal costs for production are rising, then the output 
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under uncertainty is greater than the output under certainty and then 
- * - * Q ~ Q. If marginal·costs are falling, then Q ~ Q , but the 
auditor will produce only as long as MR • P > AVC or MC > AVC which 
is where marginal cost is rising. The firm would not operate if mar-
- * ginal costs are falling, and Q • Q • O. This is not a case to be 
considered for the rational auditor. 
Introducing uncertainty into the auditor's model, then, will 
·cause an increase in the number of units to be offered. In effect, a 
larger output is produced to lessen the probability of demand being 
(12) 
greater than production. This has the effect of reducing the probability 
of a penalty. The penalty will increase total marginal costs; and to 
avoid that increase in total marginal costs, output is increased to 
cause a decrease in the expected penalty costs. 
Looking again at the expression of maximization from (10), it 
can be rearranged to give it a more meaningful i~terpretation: 
p I u' 
0 
00 
f{Q}dq f{Q}dQ + J 
Q* 
dc2 
u' --... f{Q}dQ, 
dQ 
and J u' f(Q)dQ is the expected marginal utility. 
0 
(13) 
The expected marginal utility when Q .?:. Q* is 
00 
J u' f(Q)dQ. Thus. (13) is an optimal condition which states that 
Q* 
the expected marginal utility of price equals the expected marginal 
utility of marginal costs. 
For the individual that is linear in risk preferences (i.e •• 
00 
indifferent to risk). u' is a constant. J f(Q)dQ = 1, and 
0 
dc1 dc2 oo 
P .. ---.. +--. J * f(Q)dQ 
dQ dQ Q 
or price is equal to expected marginal costs. 
OD 
The expression J 
Q* 
* f (Q)dQ is the probability that Q .?:. Q and thus 
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that a penalty will occur. The last term in (14) then is the expected 
I 
marginal cost of a penalty. The individual will produce where price is 
(14) 
equal to the marginal production costs, reduced by some expected marginal 
penalty costs. The auditor produces 'more to· allow for this reduction. 
For the individual who displays risk aversion, the expression 
remains as in (8). If it can be shown that the maximization output for 
the risk linear individual is less than the maximization output for the 
risk averse individual, then this implies that the auditor would audit 
more as he becomes more risk averse. 
* Since P is fixed, and letting Q1 represent output in the linear 
* case, QA represent output in the risk averse case, then: 
OD dc2 I u' c-*> f(Q)dQ de de * 
-t f (Q) dQ - ! + _.,Q OD __ d;;;.;QA ____ _ 
dQL dQA J u' f(Q)dQ 
(15) 
0 
Now consider only the expressions 
00 
00 
J f (Q)dQ 
Q* and 
J. u' f(Q)dQ 
Q* 
/
00 u' f (Q)dQ 
0 
t? determine their relationship. It is of interest whether 
JOO U I f (Q)dQ 
J > _Q* ____ _ f(Q)dQ < 00 
Q* J u' f (Q)dQ 
0 
The symbol"?" will be used until we have determined_ the sign of (16). 
00 
Joo U I f (Q)dQ 
J f(Q)dQ ? g* 
Q* Joo U t f (Q)dQ 
0 
00 00 00 
J f (Q)dQ f u' f (Q)dQ ? f u' f (Q)dQ· 
Q* 0 Q* 
Q* 00 00 
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(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
[l - J f (Q)dQ] J u' f (Q)dQ ? J u' f(Q)dQ. (19) 
0 0 Q* 
00 Q* 00 . 00 Q* 
J u' f(Q)dQ - J f(Q)dQ J u' f(Q)dQ ? J u' f(Q)dQ - J u' f(Q)dQ. (20) 
0 0 0 0 0 
Q* 00 Q* 
-f f (Q)dQ J u' f(Q)dQ ? - J u' f(Q)dQ. 
0 0 0 
Note that for Q ~ Q*, profits will not exceed the n1 level (where 
* * du n1 = PQ -c1 (Q) as defined on page 28), dn is a constant function at 
du(Q*) _ ,.., 
d7T(Q*) - u • Therefore: 
Q* 00 Q* 
-I f(Q)dQ J u' 
0 0 
f (Q)dQ ? - Q' f f(Q)dQ· 
0 
00 
-f u' f(Q)dQ ? - u'. 
0 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
Q* 00 
"' I. f (Q)dQ + f u' f (Q)dQ ? "' -u - u • 
0 Q* 
00 Q* 
-f u' f(Q)dQ ? - Q' [l - l f (Q)dQ]. 
Q* 0 
00 00 
-f u' f(Q)dQ ? - u' Cf f(Q)dQ]. 
Q* Q* 
d (u~) ,.. "(d1T) = u" 
dQ u dQ 
dc2 dc2 (- dQ ), and u" < 0, dQ > O, then Given that 
dc2 
u" (- dQ) > O. This implies u' is an increasing function of Q. 
Therefore, G' is never greater than any u' on the left and u' > G' and 
-u'< -u', making the questioned sign "?"a"<". Therefore, 
00 
Joo u' f (Q)dQ 
J f (Q)dQ < ...... Q* ______ _ 
Q* JOO U I f (Q)dQ 
0 
In addition, we know both expressions are less than one, but greater 
than zero. Now, reconsider the equality in (15). 
oo dc2 
d 00 d d f u~ (~) f (Q)dQ 
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(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
cl f c2 cl Q* dQA 
- + - f (Q)dQ = - + ...... ________ _ 
* * * * Joo ' (15) dQL Q dQL dQA u f (Q)dQ 
0 
For this equality to hold, there are three cases. It is known 
from the assumptions about costs 
d2c 
dc1 d2c1 dc2 
that---..> O, ~ > O, --:-"i < O, and 
2 dQ dQ dQ 
*2 > o. 
dQ 
Case I. Suppose the second term on the left side of the equality 
is greater than the second term on the right 
dc1 dc1 
--:-"i < --:-"i which in turn implies Qt < Ql· 
. dQL dQ4 dc2 dc2 
which means ----;i;" < -.... • This is feasible. 
dQL dQA 
side of (15). This implies 
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Case II. The second term on the 
dc1 dc1 
left is less than the second term 
implies dQ* > dQ*" 
L A 
on the right which 
dc2 dc2 
dQ* > dQ*" L A 
and 
But this cannot be mathematically possible, so 
this case does not hold. 
Case III. If the two second terms on each side of the equality of (15) 
dc2 dc2 
are equal, then Qt = Qt and dQ* = dQ* , which is also not mathematically 
L A 
possible knowing that 
00 
J u' f (Q)dQ 00 
J f (Q)dQ < Q.* 00 Q* J u' f (Q)dQ 
0 
unless Qt = Q1 ~ O, which is not a practical consideration for the 
auditor. 
The first case, where Qt < Qt is the only possible one, which 
means that a risk averse individual will audit more than a risk 
indifferent individual. 
Model II--An Auditor's Model Under 
Pure Competition 
Perhaps a more realistic case is where the penalty is some function 
of the number of units audited (Q*) and the number of units that should 
have been audited. (Q). In particular, the penalty is a function of the 
difference between Q and Q*. It would be appropriate to argue that as 
the amount demanded becomes closer to the amount produced, then the 
costs of a penalty should be less. 
The other terms will be defined as before, except now the penalty 
is repre'sented by c2 = c2 (Q - Q*). The profit will consist of the 
following two parts: 
TI1 = PQ* - c1 (Q*) for Q ~ Q*, 
TI2 = PQ* - c1 (Q*) - c2 (Q - Q*) for Q ~ Q*. 
If the auditor overaudits, then the profit is simply TI1 ; no penalty is 
assessed and the only costs are those deterministic ones associated with 
Q*. If the auditor underaudits, as in TI2 , there is an additional cost 
which is dependent upon the deficiency (Q - Q*), i.e., how much the 
auditor failed to audit. 
In this case, the auditor will wish to maximize: 
E[u(TI)] = 
Then, 
dE[u(TI)] • 
dQ* 
Q* 
J u [PQ* - c1 (Q*)] f(Q)dQ + Ju [PQ* - c1 {Q*) -
0 Q* 
00 
c 2 {Q - Q*)] f{Q)dQ. (28) 
Q* 
J 
0 
dc1 
u 1 (P - dQ*) f (Q)dQ + (l){u [PQ* - c1 (Q*)]} f {Q*) -
oo dc1 dc2 
0 + J u' [P - dQ* .,. d(Q _ Q*) (-1)] f(Q)dQ - (l){u[PQ* -
Q* 
c1 (Q*) - ~2 (Q - Q*)]} f(Q)dQ. (29) 
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Q* de oo dc1 dc2 . 
dE(u) • J u'(P - ;) f(Q)dQ + J u'[P - dQ* + d(Q _ Q*)] f(Q)dQ. 
dQ* 0 AQ Q* (30) 
dE(u) 
dQ* 
00 de 00 de · 
= J u'(P - dQ;) f(Q)dQ - J u'(P - d !> f(Q)dQ + 
0 Q* Q 
oo de de · 
f u'[P - dQ; + d(Q -2Q*)] f(Q)dQ. 
Q* 
oo de 00 dc2 d~6~) = f u'(P - dQ!> f(Q)dQ + f u'[d(Q _ Q*)] f(Q)dQ. 
0 Q* 
dcl oo oo dc2 
(P - dQ*) 0f u'f(Q)dQ + Q! u'[d(Q _ Q*)] f(Q)dQ = o. 
dc1 00 00 . . dc2 
(P - dQ*) / u'f(Q)dQ • - Q! u'[d(Q _ Q*)] f(Q)dQ. 
oo dc2 
de r u' [d(Q - Q*)] f(Q)dQ 
- -1. - Q* p - dQ* ____ 00 ______ _ 
f u'f(Q)dQ 
0 
or 
oo dc1 oo 00 dc2 
p of u'f(Q)dQ = dQ* of u'f(Q)dQ - Q! u'[d(Q - Q*)] f(Q)dQ. 
(31) 
(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
This model has similar results to Model I. For linear risk pre-
ferences, u' is a constant and (36) becomes 
dc1 00 dc2 
p = dQ* - Q! d(Q - Q*) f(Q)dQ. (37) 
dc2 dc2 dc2 dc2 
Since dQ* < O, by assumption, dQ* • d(Q _ Q*) (-1), then d(Q _ Q*) > O; 
and the last term on the right will be negative. The auditor indifferent 
to risk would produce where price is equal to marginal production costs 
less the expected marginal costs of the penalties, or where P = expected 
MC. 
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It can also b~ shown for Model II that the risk averse individual 
would audit more than the risk indifferent individual. Using the same 
approach as in Model I, first compare 
.. ; ,;. .·~·. :,: 
co 
l f (Q).dQ 
Q* 
co 
J u'f(Q)dQ 
to _,Q._* ___ _ 
co 
f u'f(Q)dQ 
0 
to determine their relationship. As before, "?" will be used until 
the direction of the sign has been ascertained. Then 
co 
co J u'f(Q)dQ 
J f (Q)dQ ? ...,Q*_oo __ _ 
Q* 
This becomes 
co 
J u'f(Q)dQ 
0 
QO 
- f u'f(Q)dQ ? - G' [ f f(Q)dQ] , 
Q* Q* 
where G' is a constant function of Q and represents the u' of 
· Q* i -de 
.J 'f(Q)dQ N d(u ) "(d'll') ''[ 2 (l)] " 0 and u • ow, dQ = u dQ "" u d(Q - Q*) . ; u < 
(38) 
·(39) 
0 dc2 . 
d(Q _ Q*) < O, therefore u' is an increasing function of Q. Thus, G' 
is never greater than any u' on the left side of (39). As u' i:" Q', and 
-u' < -G', the questioned sign becomes<, the same as in the case of 
Model I. QO 
00 J u'f (Q)dQ l f (Q)dQ < _Q*_QO __ _ 
Q* J u'f (Q)dQ 
0 
Given than p is fixed, the risk averse optimality condition of 
(35) and the risk linear condition of (37) will be equal. If Qt is 
(40) 
··;-!" .·.•· 
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used to represent the risk linear output and Q1 to represent the risk 
averse output, then: 
00 dc2 
d J u' d(Q - Q*) f (Q)dQ 
. cl Q* A f(Q)dQ = dQ* - _____ 00 ________ _ 
A J u'f(Q)dQ 
0 
· There are three cases which may occur. 
(41) 
Case I. The second term on the left of the equality sign is greater 
· dc1 dc1 · 
than the second term on the right. This makes dQ* > dQ* which implies 
L · A 
dc2 
< d(Q _ Q*) ~ But this is 
A 
dc2. Qt > Qf making c2 < c2 and thus d(Q - Q*) 
L A L 
I dC2 
not mathematically possible as it cannot hold that d(Q _ Q*) 
L 00 
00 J u'f(Q)dQ J f (Q)dQ < _.Q*_oo __ _ ~have 
Q* f u'f (Q)dQ 
0 
00 dc2 
00 d f u' d(Q _ Q*) f(Q)dQ f c2 f(Q)dQ > .....,Q*_. ____ A__ _ 
Q* d(Q - Qt) 00 f u' f (Q)dQ 
0 
Case II. Suppose the second term on the left of the equality sign 
dc1 · dc1 
in (41) is less than the second term on the right. Then dQ* < dQ*' 
dc2 dc2 L A 
and d(Q _ Q*) > d(Q _ Q*) • This 
L A 
which implies Qt < Qt, c2 > c2 
L A 
particular situation is feasible. 
Case III. This is where Q1 • Qt a O, which is not a point at which 
the firm wishes to operate. 
Therefore, the risk linear individual will audit less than the 
risk averse individual when the penalty is perceived to be a function 
of the difference between Q and Q*. As the auditor becomes more 
averse to risk, output will be increased to avoid the penalty. 
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The Effects of a Change in the 
Auditor's Environment 
It will be helpful to examine Models I and II, compare their 
results and determine if a change in the way penalties are assessed will 
cause a change in the auditor's output. This comparison can be used 
to assess the effect of a change in the auditor's legal environment. 
Consider just the linear models, denoting these as Q~ and Q~1 • 
and 
dc1 dc2 oo 
p = dQ* + dQ* I f CQ)dQ , 
I I Q* 
de 00 
p ... dQ; +/ 
II Q* 
dc2 
d(Q - Q* ) 'f (Q)dQ • 
II 
dc2 dc2 
Let h(Q) =---;and n(Q) = - ----*-
dQI d(Q - QI!) 
d[h(Q) - n(Q)] > 0, then h(Q) > n(Q). 
dQ 
2 
It is known that if 
d f dc2 -dc2 ] 
LdQI - d(Q - Qh>] 
dQ 
d c2 
= 0 + 2 (1), 
d(Q - Qt1> 
2 d c 2 dc2 
and d(Q _ QfI) > 0, so dQf 
Therefore: 
dc2 Joo Joo f (Q)dQ > dQ~ Q* Q* 
dc2 
> - ----d(Q - Q*u>· 
d(Q - Q* ) f(Q)dQ • 
II 
If (45) is true, then Q! < Qfr· 
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(42) 
(43) 
(44) 
(45) 
Using the same method, these results can be found for the risk 
averse situation for both models. It can be seen, then, that 
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a change (a perceived change) in the risk structure will cause a change 
:in output. In this particular analysis, it implies a greater output 
under Model II.than under Model I. This could be explained as the 
auditor, perceiving a reward for how much is audited, will audit more 
under Model II. . In effect, there is a "reward" for increasing output. , 
Whereas in Model I, the i;enalty is a function of Q and the amount _ 
audited will not affect the penalty unless production reaches Q or 
·surpasses._ it. 
Interestingly, Section II(e) of the Securities Act of 1933 would 
seem to impose penalties in a fashion more similar to Model I. That 
is, plaintiffs may recover their losses. And these losses would, 'in · 
turn, seem to be more a function of the scale of the audit, Q, than the. 
amount of auditor negligence, Q - Q*. It appears that penalties are 
based upon how much the auditor should have audited, without consideration 
~f what was actually produced. If the intent of the Act is, in part, 
to guarantee collection of a sufficient amount of audit evidence, and 
if what is deemed a sufficient amount of evidence is an unknown until 
after the audit has been completed, then the intent of the Act is 
more likely to be served under an alternative (Model II) legal 
structure. 
Model III--An Auditor's Model Under 
Monopolistic Conditions 
Consider Model I under different economic conditions, in particular, 
consider a scenario where the firm has some control over price. Demand 
at a price of P is given by Q • D{P,v) where v is a random variable, 
3 distributed by g{v) with a zero mean. The cost functions are defined 
as before with c1 m c1 (Q) being the determinstic production cost and 
c2 = c2{Q) is the penalty costs. Q* is the production by the auditor. 
The maximization will be at the values of P and Q* such that a~~u) = O, 
3E(u) 4 
aQ* = 0, and certain second order conditions are satisfied. 
The profit function is of the same form as before, and the auditor 
will wish to maximize: 
Q* 00 
E[u{n)] • f u[Q*P - c {Q*)] f{Q)dQ + f u[Q*P - c {Q*) -
0 1 Q* 1 
c2{Q)] f{Q)dQ. (46) 
00 
3v = E[v] = f vg{v)dv = 0 and v is distributed independently of 
..00 
P, so Q • D{P,v) • D{P) + v. D{P) + v > O, so that Q > O.to avoid being 
buyers instead of sellers~. Then, for any price P* expected demand Q = E[Q/P*] • E[D{P*) + v] "'"E[D{P*)] + E[v] • D{P*). The assumption 
of independence is necessary to perform some of the integration. The 
function g{v) : g([Q-D{P)) : f{Q) as before for simplification. 
4The second order conditions are that 
a2E[u(n)] 
aQ•2 
< 0 and a
2E[u(n)] 
aP2 
< o. 
See the Appendix for the satisfaction of these conditions. 
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First, look at the condition concerning Q*: 
Q* de oo dc1 dc2 aE[u(~)] - f ' 1) I ' ) ( ) aQ* u (P - dQ* f {Q)dQ + u (P - dQ* - dQ* f Q dQ. 
0 Q* (47) 
Setting this equal to zero, then 
00 de 
d J u' dQ! fCQ)dQ 
or 
- ~ _.Q,_* ______ _ 
p - dQ* + 00 
J u'fCQ)dQ 
0 
oo de oo oo dc2 
P J u'f(Q)dQ = dQ; J u'f{Q)dQ + J u' dQ* f(Q)dQ. 
0 0 Q* 
In the risk linear case, this becomes 
dc1 oo dc2 
P ... dQ* + I dQ* f CQ)dQ. 
Q* 
The other first order condition which has to be satisfied is, 
(48) 
(49). 
(50) 
Q* 00 aE[u(~)] ... I u'(Q* + dQ* P) f(Q)dQ + I u'(Q* + ddQ.P* P) f(Q)dQ, 
aP O dP Q* (5l) 
which becomes 
00 
{Q* + d~; P) J u' f{Q)dQ = O, 
0 
and further reduces to 
Q* + dQ* • p - 0 • dP 
This term is the change in revenues for a unit change in price. 
This simply suggests where the auditor should set price. Therefore 
(52) 
{53) 
P* = - Q* I dQ* (54) dP 
dQ* 
and dP < 0, by assumption, which insures that P* > o. 
dR Looking at (53), which is dP' then 
dR = Q* + dQ* p 
dP dP ' 
and by substituting the expression for P from the other first order 
condition, 
co de 
d J u' dQ; f (Q)dQ 
dR = Q* + dQ* (_2 + _.Q_*------ ) • 
dP dP dQ* co J u' f(Q)dQ 
0 
dQ* Dividing through by dP , then 
co dc2 I 
d J u' dQ* f(Q)dQ 
dR dQ* dQ* cl _Q.* dP / dP = Q* / dP + dQ* + _ co____ _ 
J u' f(Q)dQ 
0 
dR dR dP dR dQ* Since MR• dQ* = (dP)(dQ*) = (dP)/(dP ), then (57) becomes 
or 
MR = Q* 
co de 
d J u' dQ; f(Q)dQ 
dQ* cl Q* I dP + dQ* + ....__co ____ _ 
J u' 
0 
f (Q)dQ 
co co de co 
MR J u' f(Q)dQ • Q* I :Q* J u' f(Q)dQ + dQ! J u' f (Q)dQ + 
0 p 0 0 
dc2 J u' dQ* f(Q)dQ. 
Q* 
co 
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(55) 
(56) 
(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
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For the linear case, this would reduce to 
(60) 
or 
MR = MC + Q* I dQ* • dP 
Here marginal revenue is something less than expected marginal 
(61) 
dQ* ( h costs as dP < 0, by assumption. A similar interpretation olds for 
the risk aversion case of (59), except that marginal utility enters 
into the model.) 
For simplicity, only the risk linear model will be used to compare 
output under uncertainty with output under ce~tainty. The risk averse 
case will give the same results, when compared to the certainty case. 
From (60) and the second order conditions, MR{P*) ~ MC{Q*). The 
certainty output would be some Q =· Q to be sold at a price P', and 
MR(P') = MC{Q). If MR(P') = MR(P*) (implying P' = P*), then 
MR{P') ~ MC(Q*) and MR(P') = MC{Q). It follows that MC{Q) ~ MC{Q*) 
and Q ~ Q*, where P' = P*. 
If MR(P') < MR{P*), then MR(P') < MC(Q*), MC{Q) < MC{Q*) and 
Q ·~ Q* , when P' < P*. 
When MR(P') > MR(P*), two possibilities exist: (1) MR(P') > MC(Q*), 
implying MC{Q) > MC{Q*) and Q > Q*; or (2) MR(P') < MC(Q*), MC(Q) -< 
MC{Q*) and Q < Q*. When P' > P*, it is possible to have Q > Q* or 
Q < Q*, but not Q • Q*. The case where P' > P* and Q < Q* may occur 
if the average demand under uncertainty was so great that there is a 
huge penalty, and any reduction in price below P' would lower MR sub-
stantially but not influence the penalty by any appreciable amount •. 
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Summarizing, if the optimal price under uncertainty is greater 
than or equal to the optimal price under certainty, then the optimal 
output under uncertainty will be greater than that under certainty. 
If the price under certainty was greater than the price under 
uncertainty, it is still possible that the outp~t under certainty 
will be less than the output under uncertainty. But it is not clear 
this is always true. In general, there are two effects. First, the 
auditor will raise output in most situations to reduce the possibility 
of a penalty, and second, a higher price is charged to offset the higher 
costs which include the penalty. 
An additional issue is the comparison of the optimal output for 
the risk indifferent auditor portrayed by (60) to that of the risk 
averse auditor in (59). 
Knowing that Q* I:~*= Q* I :~*, then (59) becomes 
00 dc2 
dc1 f u' dQ* f (Q)dQ 
PI= dQ* + Q* A (62) 00 
A J u' f(Q)dQ 
0 
where the subscript (A) denotes that this is the P* and Q* for the 
risk evader. 
This appears to be the same optimality condition as in Model I, 
but P* is not fixed, as is the P in Model I. Using the subscript (L) 
to denote risk indifference, then (60) is 
dc1 oo de Pt = dQ* + f dQ; f (Q)dQ. 
L Q* L 
(63) 
Again, several cases may be examined. 
Case I. Consider Pt > Pl which implies MCL > MCA. This is 
dc1 dc1 dc2 dc2 
possible if dQ* > dQ* and dQ* > dQ*' implying Ql > Qf • 
L A L A 
Case II. Suppose Pt < Pf which implies MCL < MCA. This will 
dc1 dc1 dc2 dc2 
occur when dQ* < dQ* and dQ* < dQ*' which is also possible. 
L A L A 
Then 
Q* < Q*. L A 
Case III. 
dc1 dc1 dc2 dc2 
If Pt = Pf, then MCL = MCA' dQ* = dQ* and dQ* = dQ*" 
L A L A 
But this is not possible in a mathematical sense when 
l f (Q)dQ 
Q* 
J u~fCQ)dQ 
< _ Q_* ____ _ 
J u'fCQ)dQ 
0 
which is known from our previous work regarding Model I. 
The conclusions that can be made are: (1) as the quantity is 
increased, price also increases because costs are increasing; and 
(2) output will change as the auditor becomes more risk averse, but 
the direction of the change is indeterminable. 
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It is obvious that the consideration of uncertainty gives results 
different from the traditional economic approach to output and price 
determination. It can still be inferred, though, that output will most 
likely change when uncertainty is introduced and, further, it will 
change again as the auditor becomes more risk averse. 
Even though the results of the neoclassical analysis for 
monopolies show a smaller output than for pure competition, the results 
under uncertainty are not clear. The introduction of risk preferences 
and uncertainty results in ambiguity. Output will increase under pure 
competition, and it is probable that it will increase under monopoly. 
Not knowing the magnitude of the inc~ease, however, no comparison of 
the output between Model I and Model III can be made. 
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Concluaions 
The introduction of uncertainty into the auditor's model will cause 
marked differences from the results obtained in the neoclassical eco-
nomic model. 
First, the introduction of uncertainty will affect the units of 
audit service the auditor will perform. In a pure competitiort environ-
ment, where price is fixed, the utility maximizing auditor will produce 
more when faced with uncertainty. In addition, the more risk averse 
the auditor is, the more output will increase. This is in contrast to 
traditional thinking that the maximizing auditor would provide services 
at a point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. 
Under monopolistic conditions, the results are not as simple. As 
uncertainty is introduced, it is not obvious that the auditor will 
always audit more than under certainty. In most instances, the auditor 
will audit more and also will charge a higher price to compensate for 
the rise in the costs due to this incremental audit work. 
The second insight gained from the model is that the explicit 
consideration of the penalty in the model caused output to increase. 
Without the penalty, the output would have been the same as that under 
certainty, which was less. The penalty itself is an incentive for the 
auditor to audit more. 
A third conclusion from the study is that a change in manner in 
which penalties are assessed will cause a change in the output of the 
auditor. This, together with the second result above supplies us with 
an insight into how auditor behavior might be regulated. Further, this 
can be applied to subordinates' behavior so that they can make 
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preferred audit output decisions. Using a penalty/reward structure 
would induce the same results for subordinates also. 
The final result from the analysis concerned risk aversion. 
Given that there is a belief that auditors are risk averse, it is 
important that the effect of risk aversion on their audit decisions 
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be understood. In a pure competitive situation, the auditor.displaying 
risk aversion will produce more than the auditor that is risk indif-
ferent. Under the economic conditions of monopoly, it can only be 
determined that the output of a risk averse auditor will be different 
from that of a risk indifferent auditor. There is also a price effect, 
which has the same sign as the output effect. 
It has thus been shown that uncertainty, ~isk attitude, the manner 
in which penalties are assessed, and competitive aspects of auditing are 
important determinants of the supply of auditing services. Since this is 
an analytical study, it is premature to speculate on whether these results 
will actually prove useful in any practical sense. The results have 
only been shown to follow from a set of assumptions; and whether those 
assumptions indeed capture the important aspects of the audit environ-
ment simply cannot be assessed on a priori grounds. This is an 
empirical issue and is suggestive of one course for future research. 
All theoretical constraints employed in this study have empirical 
counterparts. Thus the requirement of testability in principal has 
been achieved. However, it is not entirely clear just how such empirical 
testing ought best to proceed. The abu~dance of internal auditing 
issues suggests laboratory experimentation as a promising candidate. 
Additionally, Ng (1978) has developed the rudiments of a theory 
of the demand for auditing services. A second course for fruitful 
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further research would seem to be an integration of the present stu.dy 
with that of Ng in order to obtain a full-blown equilibrium model of 
the market for auditing services. And nothing short of an empirically 
validated full-blown equilibirum model is likely to be very useful 
in obtaining the degree of understanding upon which sensible regulation 
can be based. 
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APPENDIX 
Sl•:COND OR.DKR CONDLTJONS FOR THE AUDITOR'S MODELS 
Model I 
d2E(u) 
= dQ* 
Q* Q* 2 dcl 2 d c1 I u" (P 
- dQ*) f(Q)dQ + J u' (--) dQ*2 0 
dc1 dc2 2 00 I u" (P 
- dQ* - dQ~-.> Q* 
2 d c 2 
--) f(Q)dQ . 
dQ*2 
0 
00 
f(Q)dQ + J u' 
Q* 
f(Q)dQ + 
2 d c1 (---
dQ*2 
l~or the risk U ne:ir individual, where u' > 0 and u" = 0, the above 
expression will be less than zero. The first and third terms are 
d2c 
equal to zero. 
d2c 2 
and --2 > 0. 
. dQ* 
The second and third terms are negative as --1- > 0 
dQ*2 
For the risk evading individual, where u' > 0 and u" < O, the 
expression in 
d 2c · 1 that --2 > 0 
dQ~ 
(64) is also negative. All terms are negative, given 
d 2c 2 
and --2 > 0 by assumption. 
dQ* 
61 
(64) 
Model II 
d2E(u) 
dQ*2 
This will 
d2c 
Q* dcl 2 Q* 2 d c1 
I u" (P 
- dQ*) f(Q)dQ + J · u' (--) f(Q)dQ + 
0 0 dQ*2 
()() [p dc1 dc2 ] 2 f u" - --+ d(Q - Q*) f (Q)dQ + 
Q* dQ* 
2 
d2c ] "" l d cl f u' 
- dQ*2 - d(Q - ~*)2 f(Q)dQ . Q* 
be negative for the risk linear auditor as u' > 0, 
d2c 
bl. 
(65) 
u" = 
1 0, --2 > 2 0 and > 0, by assumption. The expression (65) 
d (Q ...; Q*) 2 dQ* 
also be less than zero for 
d2c 
risk averse auditor as u' > O, u" < O, 
2 0 and -----2- > O. 
d(Q - Q*) . 
Model III 
. 2 Q* Q* 2 dcl 2 d c1 () E~u~ f u" (I' - dQ*) f(Q)dQ + f u' (- dQ* ) f(Q)dQ + ()Q*2 0 0 
2 
00 ()() dc1 dc2 2 d c1 
f u" (P - dQ* - dQ*) f(Q)dQ + J u' (- - -dQ*2 Q* 
f (Q)dQ • 
2 d c1 
Given that u' > 0, u" = O, -- > 
dQ*2 
linear case, all terms will be zero or 
Q* 
2 d c 2 
0, and --2 > 0 for the risk 
dQ* 
less than zero. In the risk 
(66) 
averse case, where u' > 0 and u" < 0, all terms in (66) will be negative. 
[ 2 E~- + d2Q* (P)l 10"'", f(Q)dQ + 
dP <ll'2 'J 
00 
J u" f(Q)dQ • 
0 
dQ* d 2Q* The terms di' - and - 2 are negative by assumption, and with 
dP 
u' > 0, the first term wll l be negative for both the risk linear 
and risk averse cases. The second term will be zero for the risk 
63 
(67) 
linear individual as u" = 0 for him. The second term will be negative 
for the risk averse individual as u" < 0. 
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